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ABSTRACT 
 Since 2015, the Navy acquisition community has undergone significant changes 
to oversight policies and contracting methods for husbanding services. The changes were 
imposed because of one of the largest corruption scandals in U.S. Navy history. The rapid 
effects of these changes have not been thoroughly analyzed. In this thesis, there is data 
from the last 5 years totaling over 6,000 husbanding service contracts and port visits. The 
authors analyzed this data to determine if the current process is having an adverse 
financial impact, including the financial impact of short-notice port visits, contractor 
competition, and the length of solicitation. They used a cross-tabulation methodology to 
determine if short-notice port visits’ request submissions have a financial impact on the 
cost of husbanding services. The authors also used cross-tabulation to determine if the 
length of solicitation time makes a difference in the daily average cost. They used cost 
indexing to quantifiably determine if contractor competition affected the price of 
husbanding contracts. After a thorough quantitative analysis, the authors determined that 
the current oversight policies and contracting methods do not have an adverse financial 
impact on the husbanding service process. Navy leadership must continue refining 
procedures to reduce processing time while increasing audit compliance. 
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The Navy acquisition community has been mired in corruption and scandal, which 
culminated with the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) “Fat Leonard” scandal. In the 
wake of the scandal, the Navy inspector general (IG) conducted an audit on the Navy’s 
internal controls and procedures. Their findings led to significant changes in oversight 
policy, including new instructions and contracting methods. Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP) directed the implementation of Off-Ship Bill Pay (OSBP) and the 
Multiple Award Contract (MAC) in 2015. The pressure to be audit-compliant meant rapid 
changes; the effects of these changes have not been thoroughly analyzed. A quantitative 
analysis was needed to identify the financial and service impacts of the implemented 
changes. Data from the last 5 years were gathered from the Husbanding Service Provider 
Portal (HSPortal), an online repository that catalogs details about each port visit, including 
cost and processing time. This research focuses on the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets, as these are 
the most active areas of responsibility (AORs) with the most annual port visits. The thesis 
research questions are centered around the policy changes’ effects on flexibility, 
competition, and cost. The first question discussed short-notice port visits. The instruction 
prescribes that a vessel should give a port 30-day notification before that ship arrives. 
Short-notice port visits occur when that time period is truncated. It is generally believed 
that if the notification period is shortened, it will drive up the cost of the port visit, as 
Husbanding Service Provider (HSP) contractors would have less time to respond and 
prepare for arrival. The second question evaluated the effect of competition in ports on the 
cost of services. The MAC Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) prescreens 
available HSP contractors and puts them into a bidding pool. When a contract is solicited, 
each contractor gets an opportunity to bid. Some ports naturally have more competition 
than others. The authors examined the effect of cost on ports with competitive 
environments versus those with non-competitive environments. Lastly, the authors 
evaluated the impact of solicitation time on the cost to verify if there is a price advantage 
in allowing more time for contractors to submit their bids.  
xvi 
Cross-tabulation methodology was used to determine if short-notice port visit 
request submissions had a financial impact on the cost of husbanding services. By using 
cross-tabulation, the authors were able to separate the data by fleet and make quantitative 
comparisons among ship class type, logistic requirement submission timelines, and average 
daily cost. The authors used cost indexing to quantifiably determine if contractor 
completion affected the price of husbanding contracts. By cost indexing, the authors could 
normalize the data to create a consistent and comparable data set. Data normalization 
allowed the authors to index the cost data series to a common starting point, which 
facilitated the comparison of cost data between fiscal years and port locations, and across 
all fleets. The adjustment of actual cost data to a more uniform basis enabled the authors 
to reduce the dispersion of the data points, provide consistency, and increase the number 
of data points that could be compared, which reduced variance in the data.  
Upon concluding the cross-tabulation analysis of short-notice port visit requests, 
the results showed that short-notice port visit logistic requirement (LOGREQ) submissions 
have no financial impact on husbanding services received. This illustrates that there is no 
correlation between cost and submission timeline. Different results were found after 
comparing competitive and non-competitive periods using cost indexing, in that 
competition did impact cost. After analyzing the cost data, the researchers concluded that 
competition has affected husbanding contract costs and that the Navy should expect to have 
higher contract costs in locations where there is only one monopolist providing husbanding 
contracts.  
The authors determined that the implemented changes had a positive effect on the 
HSP process. OSBP and the HSPortal have provided detailed oversight and accountability. 
More competition in the MAC IDIQ drives the price down and establishes a relationship 
with contractors. Even in a short-fused or emergent port visit, the pricing is not affected 
due to the competition within the MAC IDIQ. Whenever possible, the pool of contractors 
needs to be expanded so that more ports benefit from competition. Additionally, the authors 
determined that the amount of time a bid spends being solicited does not affect the average 
daily cost. It would be reasonable to assume that the longer a bid spends on the open 
xvii 
market, the more the price would decrease, as this would give more time for competition 
and for all prospective bidders to propose their bids. The data does not support that line of 
thinking. The data implies that there is no correlation between price and the length 
solicitation period. Whether the bid is on the market for 1 or 15 days, the average daily 
price stays near a baseline. After a thorough quantitative analysis, the authors have 
determined that the current oversight policies and contracting methods do not have an 
adverse financial impact on the husbanding service process. Navy leadership must continue 
refining procedures to reduce processing time while increasing audit compliance.  
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Husbanding Service Providers (HSPs) provide U.S. naval vessels of all platforms 
with all logistical requirements throughout port visits worldwide. In 2015, HSPs underwent 
a tremendous change in the wake of the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) scandal 
(sometimes referred to as the Fat Leonard scandal). The GDMA scandal was a widescale 
corruption and national security breach that involved high-ranking U.S. Navy officials and 
the contractor GDMA, a firm headed by Leonard Francis (Whitlock, 2016). The 
investigation is still ongoing and has led to the arrest of 33 people connected with the 
scandal (Whitlock, 2016). Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) directed the 
implementation of several programs to ensure the HSP program’s audit compliance. Two 
of these programs, Off-Ship Bill Pay (OSBP) and the Multiple Award Contract (MAC), 
were instituted in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, drastically changing contracting operations. 
While these changes have provided some improvement, the HSP environment has shifted 
without definitive research identifying financial and service impacts of the implemented 
changes.  
Husbanding services procedures have changed significantly since 2015, with the 
implementation of OSBP and MAC procedures. Prior to the current process, ships had little 
oversight and guidance in executing husbanding services. The current process involves 
added key players to validate and approve various steps to ensure audit readiness and 
accountability. The goal of this research was to identify the factors that affect the cost of 
Navy husbanding services. The effect of added management, the increased number of 
people involved, and the added bureaucracy on husbanding services remain a concern but 
are not included in the research. In general, this research validates current factors’ influence 
on cost. This leads us to the following questions: 
Research Question 1: Are short-fuse port visits causing an increase in costs?  
Research Question 2: What is the effect of competition on cost? 
Research Question 3: Does the length of solicitation time affect cost? 
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The researchers used an enterprise-wide cost effectiveness analysis to compare 
costs across all Navy ports using historical HSP data since implementation in 2015. Data 
was collected from the Husbanding Service Provider Portal (HSPortal), a repository for all 
U.S. Navy port visit data. In the conclusion of this project, the researchers evaluated certain 
factors and their effect on cost to the Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Fleet 
Logistics Center (FLC) Sigonella detachment in Naples, Italy. The researchers utilized data 
that included locations, dates, vendors, contract numbers, and ship types from a global 
database that records all husbanding service contracts and their contract line items. The 
data is a comprehensive list that provides detailed, port-specific information. The 
researchers exported all port visit data from October 2015 to April 2020. With the data 
from the HSPortal, the researchers used cross-tabular analysis to filter context across 
multiple relationships to determine the effects of logistics request lead-times for 
husbanding services in relation to the overall costs. 
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to validate the impact certain factors have on the 
cost of a husbanding contract. To do so, the authors analyzed the financial impact of late 
LOGREQ submissions, contractor competition, and bid solicitation time. The methodology 
of this work was cross-tabulation and cost indexing normalization. 
In accordance with current Department of Defense (DOD) policy, the HSP program 
is designed to “codify a repeatable, holistic process that is independent of person, provides 
clear governance, and has checks and balances with an inspection and feedback process” 
(Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020, p. 1 ). Public trust was broken following 
the GDMA scandal, and the Navy has sought to course-correct through transparency and 
standard operating procedures, as seen with the OSBP and the new MAC strategy. 
Additionally, oversight meetings at the fleet level were implemented in coordination with 
contracting officials at FLC (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020). As a result of 
these oversight conditions, the process to plan, execute, and reconcile a port visit has 
become stringent and time-consuming, as based on the personal observations of sailors 
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onboard the ship, FLC, and fleet staff involved in the HSP process (Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2020).  
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to compare port visit costs against the LOGREQ submissions’ 
timeliness and port competition using historical HSP data since its implementation in 
FY2016 (October 1, 2015–September 30, 2016). All data for this analysis was gathered 
from the HSPortal website. The data used is limited to the U.S. Navy 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet 
AOR beginning in FY2016 and ending in FY2019. The data used is based on HSP services 
that were paid for by the U.S. Navy to multiple contractors.  
Figure 1 shows the Navy’s numbered fleets’ geographical locations and the number 
of port visits within each fleet area of operation during FY2019. 
 
Figure 1. Numbered fleets by geographical locations. Adapted from 
NAVSUP (2020). 
In this study, the researchers did not take into consideration the quality of services 
or performance factors; they only analyzed the costs. The researchers also did not specify 
any contractors’ names or the task orders that were awarded to avoid disseminating any 
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sensitive or restricted information. All information provided within this analysis is public 
knowledge, with no limits on the dissemination of the results or findings. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
The chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: Chapter II provides background 
information relevant to understanding the culture and management controls that existed 
prior to OSBP and the MAC strategy and briefly examines the changes made in recent 
years. Chapter III presents findings from literature reviews of relevant texts. Chapter IV 
describes the methodology, data, and statistical findings used to conduct the analysis. 
Chapter V provides the analysis and interpretation of the researchers’ findings. Finally, 
Chapter VI provides conclusions and recommendations for further research.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
Following the GDMA scandal, the secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) requested an 
inspector general (IG) audit of the Husbanding Service Provider Program; the report’s 
stated goals were “to identify internal control weaknesses within the Navy’s husbanding 
and port services process” (Navy Audit Service, 2014, p. 1). The audit highlighted major 
flaws in terms of auditability and lack of proper oversight.  
Figure 2 shows the funding obligated by the fleets for port visits. The research 
focuses on the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets because they make up 82% of all obligated port visit 
funding.  
 
Figure 2. Funding obligation by fleet. Adapted from NAVSUP 
(2019). 
Each year, the Navy spends approximately $120 million on port visits (NAVSUP, 
2020). These port visits serve as opportunities for much-needed replenishments, provide a 
chance for leadership to interface with allies and partner nations, boost national defense, 
and improve quality of life for embarked service members. According to Office of the 
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Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 4400.11, the planning and execution of 
port visits are a mix of “organic, host nation, and contractor support” (Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 2020, p. 1). Prior to 2015, port visit contracts were based on a single-
award contract (SAC). Under this contract vehicle, each individual port visit was 
negotiated, and ships were required to pay all invoices and payments via U.S. Treasury 
checks with limited oversight. Since 2015, the Navy has shifted its operations to a new 
husbanding service acquisition strategy, the MAC Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity 
(IDIQ). The OPNAV instruction also puts forth a new strategy that involves OSBP, 
HSPortal, and oversight functions. 
The following definitions and programs should be understood to fully comprehend 
the data presented within the research. OPNAV Instruction 4400.11 classifies these 
programs as key to the HSP process.  
A. MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACT INDEFINITE DELIVERY 
INDEFINITE QUANTITY  
According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 16.5, IDIQ is a contract 
vehicle that the government uses when it does not know the future services that will be 
required during a fixed period of time (FAR 16.5, 2020). The regulation also states that the 
current contract being used for HSP is a MAC IDIQ. This means that multiple competing 
contractors have been awarded the base contract. In addition, the FAR states that the IDIQ 
provides the Navy a method to issue orders on each port visit it wishes to execute. The 
MAC contract is meant to lower the cost of services by utilizing competition. The offeror 
with the lowest price technically acceptable offer will be awarded the order.  
The MAC IDIQ process begins when the supporting FLC receives a logistic 
requirement (LOGREQ) from the requesting ship (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
2020). The LOGREQ contains the required husbanding services needed in port. Once the 
ship has drafted its LOGREQ, it is sent to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) 
for verification. Once the COR validates the LOGREQ, the ship sends the LOGREQ via 
official naval message to the Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) Contracting Shop (code 200). 
Ships use a standardized global LOGREQ based upon their ship class and required type of 
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visit (moored or anchored). FLC contracting specialists and CORs were not a part of the 
husbanding services prior to the use of MAC IDIQ. The FLC coordinates with the CORs 
for requirements and the Type Commanders (TYCOMs) for funding. This provides 
oversight by which husbanding service providers and services are verified.  
B. OFF-SHIP BILL PAY 
OSBP serves as the method of payment for husbanding service providers and 
vendors. It removes the financial accountability from the ship to the corresponding FLC 
code 200 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020). The FLC secures funding from 
TYCOM post verification. Payments are processed from the Defense Financial Accounting 
Service (DFAS) directly to the husbanding service provider, removing the need for treasury 
checks and large cash payments. 
The OSBP process and MAC strategy involve many key players, validators, and 
approvers that must be in place for audit readiness and accountability (Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 2020). Once the port visit is complete, the HSP submits its final 
invoice to the FLC and supporting ship for verification. A three-way match is conducted 
by the COR using the task order award, Department of Defense Form 250 (DD 250), and 
vendor invoice. Once the verification is complete, the verified documents are uploaded to 
Wide Area Workflow (WAWF), a payment capability with modules providing additional 
visibility into the Navy’s business process (Defense Logistics Agency, 2020).  
It has been said that the current process lacks automation, has multiple inputs, and 
is adversely affecting cost (Ott, 2019). Additionally, it was assumed that late LOGREQ 
submissions and the lengthy OSBP process execution were negatively affecting the cost of 
HSP services, but evidence of the actual financial impacts was unknown.  
C. DATA REPOSITORY 
In the summer of 2018, the Naval Supply Systems (NAVSUP) Business Support 
Center (BSC) instituted the HSPortal to track planning and oversee port visit information 
(Thornton, 2018). The database relies heavily on information technology to catalog and 
analyze contracts, lines of accounting, standard LOGREQs, that applies to husbanding 
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policy (Thornton, 2018). The portal is a repository of contract information that can be used 
to plan future port visits, as it contains pricing, location, and historical records. HSPortal 
serves as an audit trail and oversight function, allowing a high degree of visibility down to 
the individual vessel or port location. 
D. OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS 
The success of the HSP process is contingent on having effective oversight 
mechanisms in place to ensure proper coordination and direction of the HSP business 
processes for acquiring husbanding services during port visits. The individuals who 
provide oversight are charged with facilitating a repeatable, all-inclusive process that is 
impartial of any one person and provides clear governance. The new HSP process has 
checks and balances, unlike the previous process.  
Figure 3 is an illustration from the NAVSUP FLC Naples Pre-Deployment Brief 
and is a depiction of the prior HSP process that used the SAC method to acquire husbanding 
services from the requirements generation through husbanding service execution and 
payment. This method was used until October 1, 2015, when the Navy switched to the 
current HSP program. 
 
Figure 3. Husbanding service provider process prior to FY15. 
Adapted from NAVSUP (2019). 
Figure 4 is an illustration from the NAVSUP FLC Naples Pre-Deployment Brief 
and is a depiction of the current HSP process that uses the MAC IDIQ and OSBP. This 
demonstrates the separation of functions, auditability standards, and oversight 
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implemented to ensure compliance with the Department of the Navy business process for 
acquiring husbanding services during port visits per OPNAV Instruction 4400.11. 
 
Figure 4. Husbanding service provider process FY 2015–present. 
Adapted from NAVSUP (2019). 
OPNAV Instruction 4400.11 delineates the various personnel that have critical 
roles within the HSP process. These personnel include the customer submitting the 
requests, the fleet staff reviewing the requests, and the FLC staff processing the contract 
requirements. According to the NAVSUP Global MAC brief, the key stakeholders within 
the process are as follows: 
1. Supply Officer (SUPPO): Port visit husbanding services requirements are 
originated by the ship’s SUPPO, who acts as the logistics representative 
and sole point of contact for the husbanding agent on all husbanding 
requirements for the ship. Once the port visit requirement is known, the 
SUPPO will draft a LOGREQ and send it to the COR for review.  
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2. Contracting Officer Representative (COR): CORs play a critical role in 
the HSP process by ensuring contractors meet the commitment as 
negotiated. CORs are typically government civilians who are 
headquartered at the numbered fleet commands. They are usually experts 
on the geographical area in which they are assigned and develop expertise 
on the HSPs in that AOR. They work closely with the contracting officers 
(KOs) and SUPPOs. CORs are responsible for monitoring and overseeing 
the administration of husbanding contracts within their specific AORs. 
They also ensure that the LOGREQ submitted by the SUPPO is within the 
previously approved standards by comparing it to the standardized 
LOGREQ. If the requirement deviates, then they request that the SUPPO 
submit a deviation request.  
3. Contracting Officer (KO): KOs working at the designated FLC are 
responsible for executing the requirements for husbanding services. The 
KO requests proposals and verifies the proposals are in line with the 
contract. The KO also ensures performance of all the necessary actions for 
executing the husbanding service contract and ensures compliance with 
the terms and conditions.  
4. Type Commander (TYCOM): The training and proficiency of units and 
SUPPOs regarding port visit management is the responsibility of the 
TYCOMs. Each TYCOM ensures that funding for a ship’s port visit is 
centrally located. After each port visit, the TYCOMs validate all port visit 
documents to issue the final payment to the contractor.  
If a deployed unit desires to exceed contract line-item quantities or has a 
requirement not currently on the Global Standardized Logistic Requirement (SLR), the unit 
must submit a deviation request to the Numbered Fleet Command (NFC), which is subject 
to the approval of the assistant chief of staff for logistics (N4). The N4 has the authority to 
approve deviations up to certain thresholds depending upon the respective TYCOM. If the 
request exceeds the prescribed thresholds, then the N4 has to coordinate with the TYCOM 
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to ensure funding is available. When the request is below the threshold, the process for 
approval is generally a quick 48-hour turnaround time. More scrutiny and time are added 
when the thresholds are exceeded. This information is captured in the HSPortal. Past 
deviation requests should be reviewed by CORs in the planning stages of a port visit.  
E. NAVY’S STANDARD LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS LACK STANDARD 
SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES 
To help standardize its husbanding program, the Navy created HSPortal as the 
official repository for all HSP data. The HSPortal database is comprehensive and contains 
HSP information pulled from multiple sources to be viewed, stored, and analyzed in one 
place. OPNAV 4400.11 mandates the use of HSPortal for HSP stakeholders for 
requirement development and as a data entry repository. Currently, the SLR templates can 
be downloaded from HSPortal and are separated by ship class and mooring type.  
The Naval Audit Service report N2019-0013 highlighted how the Navy’s 
requirement system lacks proper standardization and processes to ensure ship personnel 
did not request and pay for services not required or even necessary. The audit focused on 
procedure after October 1, 2016, and found that the SLR templates failed to identify port-
specific requirements and listed some possible requirements as “omit if not required” 
(Naval Audit Service, 2019, p. 3). The report views the lack of specific port requirement 
guidance as an issue because the SLR template is relied on by ship personnel for direction 
on ordering goods and services when visiting new and unfamiliar ports. The report stated 
that quantities and types of requirements change for each port, and the capabilities for the 
port may or may not require additional services. However, the report found that the current 
HSP process enables all items on SLR template to be ordered by ships, irrespective of their 
actual need. Specifically, the report discovered the Navy unnecessarily purchased $60,000 
in oil boom services for a ship’s port visit. The report stated that the needless purchase was 
a result of the lack of port-specific requirements within the SLR ordering process and that 
unless the Navy changes its system, these unwanted purchases will continue to occur.  
The SLR process also lacks consistent methodologies for determining maximum 
allowable limits for quantities, as found by the Naval Audit Service report N2019-0013. 
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The report discovered that the Navy allows each NFC the ability to generate its own 
maximum allowable limits for ports within its area of operation. Specifically, the report 
found that one NFC used the highest quantity historically ordered, while another used the 
average of all historical orders. The report viewed the inconsistent methodology for 
determining quantity limits across the fleet as a problem because ships are at greater risk 
of ordering unnecessary items and excessive quantities.  
The Navy has made great progress in improving the HSP requirements generation 
and approval process since the original Naval Audit Service report N2014-0048 was issued 
in September 2014. However, the progress and corrective actions were not enough. The 
Naval Audit Service report N2019-0013 recommended to U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet, and NFCs to revise the SLR process to ensure consistency with 
requirements and that they accurately reflect the needed goods and services for the ship. 
The report also recommended that the Navy include port-specific requirements within the 
SLR process to be used across all NFCs and for these requirements to be updated as needed.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is impossible to discuss the policy changes to the HSP program without 
understanding the contextual and cultural shifts within the Navy after the fallout from the 
GDMA scandal. Widespread corruption in the 7th Fleet exhibited a breakdown in ethical 
leadership and sound policy. While much discussion has centered around the prosecution of 
the individuals responsible for this breach in trust, there was also a need to correct the policies 
that made the corruption possible. According to a Washington Post investigative report, the 
GDMA scandal broke in 2013 when federal investigators arrested Leonard Francis, the head 
of GDMA, in San Diego (Whitlock, 2016). Francis complied with investigators and pleaded 
guilty to bribery and falsifying invoices to steal more than $35 million. He successfully ran 
his scheme for over a decade (Whitlock, 2016). Charges have been filed against over 30 
people, and at least 20 have pleaded guilty (LaGrone, 2019). As a result of the scandal, then–
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Ray Mabus ordered an audit of the HSP. The Naval Audit 
Service report N2014-0048, Navy Husbanding and Port Services Contracts, was an objective 
yet scathing account of the failures in the HSP process. The overall program had few internal 
controls, and key personnel, such as SUPPOs, lacked appropriate training on their roles and 
responsibilities. The audit found that not only had GDMA exploited these weaknesses for 
monetary gain, but the process was vulnerable to be exploited by other HSPs (Moran, 2016). 
SECNAV correctly saw that a change in culture and policy was needed to reinforce the 
ethical standards. Key findings from articles, instructions, previous theses, and the naval 
audits are highlighted in the remainder of this section.  
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE TOPIC OF HUSBANDING SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
Analysis of the Multiple Award Contracting Strategy on U.S. Government 
Husbanding Service Provider (HSP) Prices, the most recent thesis on this topic at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), was published in 2020 (Kiengsiri et al., 2020). The research 
focused on comparing the MAC to the SAC IDIQ. That study sought to compare quantitative 
data to see if the MAC was, in fact, a more economical contracting vehicle than the traditional 
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SAC. The authors used a series of regression analyses to directly compare port visits from 
before and after the change in 2016. Pricing information was retrieved from HSPortal, the 
same database used for this thesis. Individual contract line items were compared to see how 
costs fluctuated over time. While some line items increased in cost, the total cost of port visits 
declined. The study covered a three-year period and determined that the MAC was the more 
economical contracting method (Kiengsiri et al., 2020).  
Kiengsiri et al. (2020) did not look at the effect of last-minute port visit planning, 
sometimes called “short-fuse” port visits, where requirements are developed and then a task 
order is submitted for bid in a matter of days as opposed to the recommended 30-day lead-
time. It was assumed that, if a requirement was produced late, the cost would greatly increase, 
as HSPs would have less time to source the requirements. Additionally, changes in schedule 
and operational factors can limit the planning horizon. The research also did not assess 
competition among contractors inside the MAC. Short-fuse port visits can limit the 
competitive nature of the MAC, given that a narrow window to compete the task order will 
naturally exclude some HSPs from submitting a bid.  
Another NPS thesis, Worldwide Husbanding Process Improvement: Comparative 
Analysis of Multiple Contracting Methodologies, was published in 2007 (Gundemir et al., 
2007). The research focused on forecasting and simulating expenses for future budgets. The 
Gundemir et al. (2007) thesis predates the MAC and therefore only focuses on the previous 
SAC type. What is significant about this research is that it was conducted during the 
timeframe of the Fat Leonard scandal, but the researchers saw a need to define “a flat-rate, 
low-variability, well-defined and constant set of requirements [that] minimizes risk and price 
fluctuations” (Gundemir et al., 2007, p. 55). When Navy leadership realized that logistic 
requirements needed to be flexible and should be grouped by geographic location, they 
introduced what was to be known as the Standardized LOGREQ (Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2020). The standardized LOGREQ was created using historical data and 
subject matter expertise so that there was no ambiguity on the services a ship would need in 
port. Each numbered fleet was responsible for setting the standardized LOGREQ for its 
region, and the MACs were aligned to the region therein. The most recent naval audit has 
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inspired a broad desire to consolidate the regional MACs into one global MAC now that each 
ship type has its own global LOGREQ that captures its port service needs. 
The MAC contract strategy was previously utilized by the Navy. In 2015, a thesis by 
NPS students titled Multiple Award, Multiple Order Contracts—The Future of Navy Surface 
Maintenance Procurement examined maintenance contracts for surface vessels (Duncan & 
Hartl, 2015). Duncan and Hartl compared the MAC to the SAC in a similar fashion as the 
group in 2020, but in the context of maintenance. Their emphasis was on creeping 
requirements that caused the work package to grow, causing an increase in costs. They 
determined that the MAC was more effective in curbing these costs and led to better on-time 
completion. While this was a good example of the MAC strategy in practice, there is a 
difference in the nature of the two programs; specifically, a maintenance contract focuses on 
an end product. A task is assigned and has specific measurable items that either meet the 
requirement or do not meet the requirement. Conversely, HSP contracts tend to focus on 
services. There are certain material products that must be delivered in order for the contractor 
to fulfill the contract obligation, but there is a qualitative component that is harder to measure. 
Contract fulfillment for port visits is more subjective than it is for maintenance. This study 
was useful for its initial fielding of the MAC strategy but should be caveated by the difference 
therein.  
B. CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRIOR NAVAL SERVICE AUDITS 
Prior to the MAC implementation, a key weakness in the HSP program was the 
requirements generation and approval process, as outlined in the Naval Audit Service report 
N2014-0048 (Naval Audit Service, 2014). The audit report was conducted at the request of 
secretary of the SECNAV in response to the fraudulent activities conducted by GDMA 
contractors and Navy officials. The report focused on identifying “internal control 
weaknesses within the Navy’s husbanding and port services processes” (Naval Audit 
Service, 2014, p. 40) 
In response to the Naval Audit Service report N2014-0048, the Navy issued a new 
policy, OPNAV Instruction 4400.11, Husbanding Service Provider Program Policy, dated 
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June 2, 2016 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020). OPNAV 4400.11 was drafted 
and issued to be the Navy’s comprehensive policy for standardizing the HSP Program 
process across the Department of the Navy. The instruction addressed the following problem 
areas that were highlighted in the Naval Audit Service report N2014-0048: 
• Authorities 
• Responsibilities 
• Requirement generation and approval 
• Ordering 
• Surveillance 
• Receipt and acceptance 
• Invoicing and payment (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020) 
In addressing specific issues regarding the requirements generation and approval 
process, OPNAV 4400.11 corrective actions included  
• Providing increased control over the requirement generation and approval 
process for ships by creating a SLR template and review process 
• Removing the ordering authority from ships for HSP supplies and services 
and shifting the authority to NAVSUP FLCs and their KOs, who were more 
trained in executing task orders 
• Appointing CORs to oversee delivery of HSP contracts, goods, and services 
for increased task order surveillance 
• Providing additional examination of HSP goods and service payments by 
implementing the OSBP process 
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• Establishing program managers to oversee the daily execution of the HSP 
program at U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) and U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) type 
commands (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2020) 
These actions are evidence the Navy made progress in correcting issues regarding 
requirements generation and approval. However, the Naval Audit Service (2019) conducted 
and issued the follow-up Audit Report N2019-0013 in June 2019 that showed significant 
weaknesses remained. 
Naval Audit Service report N2019-0013 found that the Navy’s SLR templates and 
deviation “process were not standardized across the Numbered Fleet Commands” (NFCs; 
Naval Audit Service, 2019). Additionally, the report found that the SLR templates lacked the 
“necessary internal controls needed to ensure that only goods and services required were 
ordered by shipboard personnel “(NFCs: Naval Audit Service, 2019). Specifically, the report 
highlighted how the SLR templates failed to accurately estimate the ships’ actual needs, did 
not take into consideration port-specific requirements, and did not use any quantitative data, 
statistical analysis, or any consistent methodologies to determine maximum allowable limits 
on volumetric services, such as trash, water, or waste.  
Audit Report N2019-0013 further showed that the deviation process failed to 
maintain proper segregation of duties, approving authorities did not always set the 
appropriate levels, and proper documentation was not maintained. The report stressed how 
these weaknesses continued to expose the Navy to unnecessary ordering, undue influences, 
and the fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of the GDMA scandal. 
C. SUMMARY 
The articles, instructions, and previous research discussed in this chapter provided 
historical context and exhibited gaps in the understanding of an ever-changing environment. 
Fiscal transparency and repeatable process clarity has been a long-term goal of the Navy and 
the wider DOD (H.R. 5687, 1990). It is imperative for the Navy to be a good steward of 
public funds and to maintain the highest ethical standards. This can be achieved through 
sound policy and quality training that is informed by empirical evidence and judgment. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
This chapter covers the methodology of data aggregation, cleaning, and analysis 
used to answer the three research questions of this thesis. 
A. COST EFFECTS OF SHORT-NOTICE PORT VISITS 
Based on the NAVSUP FLC Sigonella research directive, this project explored the 
financial impact of short-notice port visit LOGREQ submissions on the cost of services. 
Given that husbanding agents have less time to resource the services provided, the 
researchers expected that the later the LOGREQ was submitted, the higher the cost would 
be. This section describes the methodology the researchers used to analyze the data.  
1. Source of Data 
Per HSPortal, the U.S. Navy conducted 5,892 port visits in the 5th, 6th, and 7th 
Fleets from October 1, 2015, to April 30, 2020. The HSPortal is an online repository of 
U.S. Navy port visits worldwide that stores husbanding service data. The data used for this 
project is considered unclassified and was downloaded directly from HSPortal. The COR, 
KO, and ship SUPPO from the respective fleets are responsible for adequately submitting, 
verifying, and validating that the cost data are accurately inputted in the HSPortal. This 
data creates the groundwork for the price comparison between on-time and late 
submissions of a LOGREQ. The researchers analyzed and scrubbed the data for accuracy. 
2. Data Sample 
The initial sample contained 5,892 port visits that were executed over the 4-year 
period. The researchers utilized the specific data from HSPortal for this analysis: ship type, 
fleet, port location, total port visit cost, arrival date, departure date, and LOGREQ received 
date. Each data element downloaded from HSPortal is described in Table 1. Next, the 
researchers grouped all ship types into six different ship classes as defined in Table 2.  
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Table 1. Summary and description of required data elements 
DATA ELEMENT DESCRIPTION 
SHIP TYPE Hull type of a ship 
FLEET Numbered fleet where the port visit was executed 
TOTAL PVST COST All-inclusive costs of husbanding services for port visit 
ARRIVAL DATE Date the port visit started 
DEPARTURE DATE Date the port visit ended 
LOGREQ RECEIVED DATE Date LOGREQ was submitted to COR from the ship 
 
Table 2. Ship classes and descriptions of ship types 
SHIP CLASS DESCRIPTION OF SHIP TYPE 
AMPHIB 
Dock Landing Ship (LSD) 
Landing Platform/Dock (LPD) 
CRUDES 
Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) 
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) 
LARGE DECK 
Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) 
Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) 
Aircraft Carrier (CVN) 
MSC SHIPS 
Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) 
Submarine Tender (T-AS) 
Command Ship (LCC) 
Hospital Ship (T-AH) 
Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship (T-AKE) 
Underway Replenishment Oiler (T-AO) 
Fast Combat Support Vessel (T-AOE) 
Cable Laying/Repair (T-ARC) 
Rescue/Salvage Ship (T-ARS) 
Fleet Ocean Tugs (T-ATF) 
Expeditionary Fast Transport Vessel (T-EPF) 
Expeditionary Mobile Base (T-ESB) 
SMALL CRAFT Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
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SHIP CLASS DESCRIPTION OF SHIP TYPE 
Mine Countermeasure (MCM) 
Coastal Patrol (PC) 
SUBMARINES 
Fast Attack (SSN) 
Ballistic Missile (SSBN) 
Guided Missile (SSGN) 
 
After data was reviewed and categorized into ship classes, the number of days for 
each port visit was calculated. This was done by calculating the departure date and 
subtracting the arrival date. Next, the daily cost was calculated by taking the total port visit 
cost and dividing it by the port visit’s number of days. Since there were many data points 
per ship class, this was the best method of getting a comparable data point across all port 
visits for the project. All ship visits vary in the number and types of services they receive. 
The researchers were able to establish a baseline by taking the average of each. Finally, the 
researchers calculated the number of days from the port visit that the ship submitted the 
LOGREQ. This was done by taking the ship’s port visit arrival date and subtracting the 
LOGREQ received date. After establishing the baseline data, the researchers then began to 
scrub the data. The methodology utilized is described in the following section.  
3. DATA SCRUBBING 
Data scrubbing is a critical step before performing an analysis. Excluding 
inaccurate or incomplete data improved the data sample’s quality and improved confidence 
in findings on the effect of late LOGREQ submissions on costs. The following three steps 
were used to clean the data: 
a. Step 1: Exclude canceled port visits and transits 
The first step in scrubbing the data involved excluding all canceled port visits, zero 
cost, and transits. The canceled port visits did not reflect full and accurate pricing since 
port visits either had a zero charge or just a cancellation fee. A transit port visit occurs 
when the vessel is going through a strait and requires additional support from shore 
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installations to safely navigate. The transits only consist of a tug fee, which would not be 
a valid data point to be averaged into port visits that consisted of full services. Neither one 
of these exclusions would provide an accurate daily cost to be averaged with executed port 
visits. Using the “sort” function in Excel, the researchers identified and removed all 
canceled port visits and transits. A total of 392 data points were removed from the complete 
database list of 5,892 port visits. Of these, 156 port visits were removed because they were 
listed as canceled or as transit, representing 39.8% of all port visits excluded.  
b. Step 2: Exclude port visits with missing data elements  
The second step in data scrubbing involved excluding all port visits with missing 
or invalid required data elements such as LOGREQ received dates, ship type, arrival date, 
departure date, or port visit total. These data fields were required for each port visit to 
identify the effect of late LOGREQ submissions on average daily costs. The researchers 
used the “sort” function in each of the categories to find any missing data. Out of 392 port 
visits that were removed from the data, 137 port visits were removed due to missing data. 
Exclusion due to missing elements represented 34.9% of all excluded port visits. 
c. Step 3: Exclude outliers utilizing the empirical rule 
The final step in data scrubbing is to identify and remove all outliers. An outlier is 
a data point that is unlikely to occur within a random sample. Keeping outliers in the dataset 
can skew the results by minimizing or maximizing the estimation. Outliers can be caused 
for multiple reasons. For example, a contractor may know they are the only HSP capable 
of providing services at that time, and the contractor could price all items at the highest 
price allowable per the contract, which leads to an inflated port visit cost. Outliers could 
also be caused by human error in data entry into the HSPortal database.  
The researchers calculated the standardized value of daily cost per port visit within 
each ship class using a Normal distribution to identify outliers. Once the sample size is 
greater than 30, the distribution becomes bell-shaped, resembling a Normal distribution 
(Lumen Candela, 2020). Each ship class group in the researchers dataset met the sample 
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size criteria. Utilizing the empirical rule means that 99% of the data from the dataset will 
fall within plus or minus three standard deviations of the mean. Anything outside this 
would be considered an outlier from a normal distribution; they would either be extremely 
small or large values, and, therefore, the researchers considered them to be outliers. The 
process for removing extreme values established the legitimacy of the daily costs pulled 
from the HSPortal and increased the accuracy of findings. Of the total of 392 port visits 
removed from the dataset, 99 port visits were removed using this method (representing 
25.3% of all excluded port visits).  
4. CROSS-TABULATION  
The researchers excluded 392 port visits from the data sample based on the three 
steps for scrubbing the data. After data scrubbing, only 5,500 port visits remained. The 
researchers used the cross-tabulation method in Excel via a pivot table to identify the effect 
that a LOGREQ has on price. The researchers used six data elements in this model, listed 
in Table 1. The researchers split all ship types into six ship classes, listed in Table 2. Each 
group was separated into seven LOGREQ submission timeline ranges, from 0 to 30 and 
above in increments of 5 days. All port visit entries were then categorized into each of 
those ranges. 
The first cross-tabulation model (Model 1) consisted of two tables. The first table 
showed the average daily cost for each ship class for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets (aggregate). 
The second table counted the number of port visits contributing to the values in the first 
table. The two tables in Model 2 allocated the information in Model 1 to the 5th, 6th, and 
7th Fleets, but independently.  
B. IMPACT OF CONTRACTOR COMPETITION ON COST 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2010), competitive 
contracts can save taxpayer dollars, improve the performance of contractors, and reduce 
fraud. In this section of the research, the researchers sought to validate whether contractor 
competition has an impact on the cost of HSP task orders. The intent was to evaluate the 
port visit data, filtering out irrelevant or incomplete elements, and focus on the most 
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accurate data entries that could be used unilaterally across all contractors to effectively 
validate cost savings. 
1. Competition and Solicitation Procedures 
As U.S. deficits continue to grow and defense budgets continue to shrink, 
government agencies have placed a greater focus on competitive contracting, as seen with 
the 2015 initiative of Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0 (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acqiusition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2015). BBP 3.0’s 
aim is to achieve dominant capabilities through cost consciousness, professionalism, and 
technical excellence (OUSD[AT&L], 2015). Specifically, BBP 3.0 focuses on the 
following eight areas:  
• Achieve affordable programs 
• Achieve dominant capabilities while controlling life-cycle costs 
• Incentivize productivity in industry and government 
• Incentivize innovation in industry and government 
• Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy 
• Promote effective competition 
• Improve tradecraft in acquisition of services 
• Improve professionalism of total acquisition workforce (OUSD[AT&L], 
2015) 
Each of these focus areas is equally important. However, this section focuses on 
the impact that effective competition can have on contracting for husbanding services.  
Within government procurement, competition is defined as the government 
determining from whom to procure goods and services (Nash et al., 2013). The competitive 
process is conducted through solicitations and entertaining offers from multiple 
competitors, comparing them, and accepting one based on the offer’s value to the agency 
(Nash et al., 2013). The governing document for competitive procurement within the 
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federal government is the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 (2011). Any 
federal procurement contract that is not specifically authorized by a particular statute is 
subject to the guidelines of CICA (2011). One of the most prominent guidelines outlined 
by CICA (2011) is the requirement that agencies conducting procurement for goods and 
services shall be entered into after “full and open competition through the use of 
competitive procedures” (para. 2).  
A decade after CICA (2011) was passed, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA) of 1994 was passed to simplify competitive contracting (GAO, 2010). FASA 
established a preference for MAC strategies that utilized task order and delivery order (TO/
DO) contracts (CICA, 2011). MAC is the same strategy utilized to contract the Navy’s 
husbanding services. Although the MAC itself is subject to CICA, TO/DO contracts are 
not (GAO, 2010). However, FASA requires agencies using MACs to provide contractors 
“a fair opportunity to be considered” when TO/DO contracts are issued in excess of $3,000, 
unless 
• The agency’s need for the services or property is of such unusual urgency 
that providing such opportunity to all such contractors would result in 
unacceptable delays in fulfilling that need;  
• Only one such contractor can provide the services or property required at 
the level of quality required because the services or property ordered are 
unique or highly specialized;  
• The task or delivery order should be issued on a sole-source basis in the 
interest of economy and efficiency because it is a logical follow-on to a 
task or delivery order already issued on a competitive basis; or  
• It is necessary to place the order with a particular contractor in order to 
satisfy a minimum guarantee (CICA, 2014).  
Because Navy ships sometimes pull into remote and less-populated ports, finding 
husbanding support can be challenging. The lack of organic resources creates an 
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environment where there is only one viable husbanding service provider, forcing Navy 
contracting officials to issue the TO/DO contract without the benefit of other competitive 
proposals to make an accurate cost decision. Before this study, the cost impact regarding 
the lack of contractor competition was unknown and worthy of further analysis.  
2. Sources of Data 
Refer to paragraph A.3, Steps 1 through 3, for the same procedures to source and 
scrub the data sources. The same scrubbed data source used to address the first research 
question, which contained 5,500 port visits from the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets between 
October 1, 2015 and April 30, 2020, was used for the second question. 
3. Additional Data Scrubbing 
There was a slight refinement in the data to better accommodate price analysis. 
Ports with 10 or fewer visits were classified as outliers and were removed, and only normal 
port visits were included. Ports not frequently visited fail to provide sufficient evidence for 
competition criteria. Other event types, such as brief stops for fuel (BSF) or brief stops for 
provisions (BSP), were removed to only analyze actual port visits. In total, 930 port visits 
were removed from the additional data scrubbing, leaving a remainder of 4,570 port visits 
to be analyzed.  
4. Methodology 
The researchers used cost indexing to normalize the data and create a consistent 
and comparable data set. The methodology allowed cost normalization of the data series to 
have a common starting point, which facilitated the comparison of cost data between fiscal 
years and port locations, and across all fleets. The adjustment of actual cost data to a more 
uniform basis has two benefits: (a) it reduces the dispersion of the data points and provides 
consistency, and (b) it increases the number of data points that can be compared, which 
smooths out the data set.  
To index the cost data, the values had to be adjusted to equal each other in a given 
starting period in terms of their relative value compared to a base quantity. The 
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conventional starting value of 100 was used with the base quantity being the cost data at 
the fleet level. Each value was normalized from the starting value of 100. Port index values 
are relative to the fleet and represent percent change above or below the fleet’s average 
cost data. Contractor index values are relative to the port and represent percent change 
above or below the port’s average cost data. Table 3 illustrates the indexing and 
normalization methodology used to compare relative values of contractor costs to those of 
the port and port costs at the fleet level.  





6th Fleet $12,964 100 
Gaeta $17,387 134 
Global Defense Logistics (GDL) $24,249 139 
Multinational Logistics Services (MLS)  $19,832 114 
Shipping Consultants Associated (SCA) $12,591 72 
 
Port visit average daily costs were used as the base value. The average daily cost 
was calculated by dividing the total cost of the port visit by the total length (in days) of the 
port visit. Port index values reflect the relation of port costs to the fleet’s average. To 
determine if contractor competition has an impact on contract costs, non-competitive port 
index data was compared with competitive port index data.  
  
Relative to fleet average 
Relative to port average 
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Table 4. Subic Bay contract cost and index values for FY 2016 and 
FY 2017 
 FY 2016 FY 2017 
FLT/Port/CTR Daily Cost (avg) Index 
Daily Cost 
(avg) Index 
7th Fleet $16,530 100 $11,804 100 
Subic Bay $13,614 82 $5,989 51 
Inchcape Shipping Services $0 0 $8,912 149 
Multinational Logistics Services $13,614 100 $5,282 88 
Parsh Marine $0 0 $8,959 150 
Parsh Marine Philippines $0 0 $6,099 102 
Seaway Filipinas Logistics $0 0 $4,289 72 
 
The researchers used a fiscal year as the period in which to classify if a port was 
competitive or non-competitive. For example, Subic Bay in FY 2016 is one period. 
Contracts won by a single contractor in a given port during a fiscal year indicated a non-
competitive period. Conversely, contracts won by multiple contractors during a fiscal year 
indicated a competitive period. The data was analyzed over 5 fiscal years (2016 through 
2020), totaling 170 periods across the 34 ports. Of the 170 periods, eight (4.7%) had zero 
contracts executed during the period. Non-competitive periods totaled 65 (38.2%), and 
competitive periods totaled 97 (57.1%). 
C. IMPACT OF SOLICITATION PERIOD ON AVERAGE DAILY COST 
The third research question centers around the value-added step of solicitation. 
Specifically, does the length of solicitation time make a difference in the daily average 
cost? It is hypothesized that the more time contractors have to bid, the more proposals 
would be submitted with greater price fidelity. The HSP Process is broken up into distinct 
parts in which a stakeholder has a specific role and task to perform. HSPortal records these 
actions and time stamps them when the port visit proceeds from step to step. The accuracy 
and completeness of data entry has gotten progressively better since the program’s 
implementation in 2015. Mandatory compliance was instituted on October 1, 2017, with 
the start of FY 2018. After that point, the data is significantly more accurate. For this 
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reason, the researchers focused on the data set beginning on October 1, 2017. The steps are 
defined as follows:  
1. Logistic Requirement to Code 200  
The first major step in the process is setting the requirements for a port visit, which 
is done through a LOGREQ. Once approved by the Commanding Officer, the message is 
sent to the AOR’s requisite FLC, where a COR vets the requirements to ensure compliance 
with standard requests and fleet guidance. There is dialogue back and forth to the ship to 
capture all needs. Once the COR is satisfied, the message is sent to the KO. This step is 
initiated with the LOGREQ date time group Date and concluded with the Sent to Code 200 
date in the HSPortal.  
2. Code 200 to Request for Task Order Proposal Issue 
The KO works with the Code 200 shop at the requisite FLC. Once the KO receives 
the requirements, the KO puts those into a contract format called a Request for Task 
Order Proposal (RTOP). The KO works with the assigned COR to ensure all requirements 
are listed as the vessel intends.  Once the RTOP is constructed, it is sent to the vendors 
within the MAC for solicitation and bid proposals.  
3. Solicitation Period: Request for Task Order Proposal Issue to Request 
for Task Order Proposal Due Date  
The solicitation period is a key step in the process and is the basis for Research 
Question 3: Is the amount of time given to vendors sufficient to receive the best price? 
Would the Navy benefit from lengthening or curtailing this period? Once the RTOP is 
complete, it is sent to a market of HSPs that can bid on the contract.  The MAC includes 
a pool of prescreened HSPs that are qualified to provide services to U.S. naval warships. 
The KO tries to provide sufficient time for the HSPs to bid in order to allow for robust 
competition. There is a specified due date when the RTOP is issued because there are still 
several steps to complete prior to ship arrival.   
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4. Evaluation: Request for Task Order Proposal Due Date to Task Order 
Award 
Another key step is the evaluation period. Once the HSPs have submitted their 
proposals, the KO reviews them to ensure the requirements are met and selects the offer 
with the lowest price technically acceptable.  
5. Task Order Award to Arrival  
Once the KO has selected the HSP, a task order is drafted. This is the official 
contract between the U.S. government and the HSP. Once everything is signed, the HSP 
begins to prepare for the vessel’s arrival to the port. Again, the KO wants to give the HSP 
as much time as possible to prepare. This can be a stressful step, as there is limited time for 
the HSP and its subcontractors to have all requirements ready for the vessel’s arrival at the 
port. At the conclusion of this step, the vessel arrives in the port. If the contract is not in 
place by the time the vessel arrives, then the service will not be available to meet the ship’s 
needs. The port visit may be delayed or canceled, which could impact the mission of the 
ship or affect the readiness. 
6. Port Visit: Arrival to Departure  
This step records when the vessel arrives in port and when it departs. Upon arrival, 
the HSP provides the requested services.  Some augmentation and modification can be 
made if required, but this is predominantly an execution phase.  
7. Departure to Task Order Complete  
At the end of the port visit, there are many documents that are required to be 
completed. A three-way match of the HSP Contractor Invoice, the Material Inspection and 
Receiving Report (DD Form 250), and the Port Visit Checklist (PVCL) must be conducted 
and be free of discrepancies before payment can be issued. Every contract line item is 
reviewed and accounted for, and the KO will address any disputes or contractual challenges 
to the HSP. This is also an opportunity for the ship’s company to record comments on the 
quality of services rendered. The ship’s company ensures that all services are met and are 
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within an agreeable standard. Once the task order is complete, the process for payment 
begins. Applicable paperwork is sent to DFAS to be administered.  
8. Data Scrub 
As previously mentioned, the dataset contained entries with data omissions and 
inconsistencies. The researchers scrubbed the data to remove theses errors in a different 
procedure than previously described to address research question 3. The following steps 
were taken to scrub the raw data from HSPortal for errors:  
Step 1. The raw data for port visits from FY 2018–FY 2020 were compiled. The 
data started on October 1, 2017, and concluded April 30, 2020. The initial data set consisted 
of 3,864 port visit entries.  
Step 2. Canceled and $0 port visits were removed from the data. The researchers 
removed 1,055 entries, leaving 2,810 port visit entries.  
Step 3. “Bad data” is defined as date omission or dates that should have been but 
were not chronological (e.g., LOGREQ submission after port arrival). The researchers 
identified the rows with “good” data. All other rows of data were omitted in the analysis, 
leaving only the “good” data. First, the researchers determined the number of days each 
step took by comparing successive steps. The entire HSP Process is sequential, so each 
step can only begin once the predecessor has been completed. Next, the HSP process time 
was calculated by comparing the LOGREQ release date to the vessel’s arrival-in-port date. 
This serves as the denominator when calculating the solicitation time percentage. Finally, 
each step was placed in chronological order, and the duration of each step (in days) was 
calculated. The data entries that resulted in negative durations were determined to be “bad” 
and were removed from the data set. Of all entries, 1,247 were removed. This left 1,563 
port visit entries.  
Step 4. The researchers calculated the percentage of time that the solicitation period 
lasted compared to the total pre-port-visit arrival time using the simple formula of 
solicitation days/time to port visit. This figure was used as a normalized measure of 
solicitation time.  
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Step 5. The scope of this analysis was to compare normal port visits; therefore, line 
items in the data set labeled as Straits Transits, Dry Dock Visits, Ammunition On/Offloads, 
BSF, and BSP were not good examples on which to base the port visit analysis. As a result, 
they were removed from the data set. Removing Ammunition On/Offloads subtracted an 
additional 35 line items from the dataset. Dry Docks removed 15 entries, BSF removed 60 
entries, and BSP removed 85 entries. The new total was 1,368 port visits.  
Step 6. Port visits with uncommonly long solicitation periods (greater than 15 days) 
were removed from the data set. This resulted in 42 entries being removed. The size of the 
resulting dataset was 1,326 entries. 
Step 7. Port visits with solicitation periods of 0 days were removed because this 
was either an emergent request or an error in the data set. A total of 119 line items were 
removed, resulting in the final data set of 1,207 port visits.  
9. Methodology 
For this research question, the solicitation period was compared to the average daily 
cost of the port visit. The researchers used a cross-tabulation method in Excel via a pivot 
table to demonstrate the effect that the solicitation period had on cost. Scatter plots were 
used to graphically display the information. Two models were used to compare the results. 
The first model measured solicitation period as the number of days, and the second model 
measured solicitation period as a percentage of the pre-arrival HSP process time. The ratio 
is defined as the number of days the proposal was in solicitation time divided by the number 
of days in the pre-arrival process (shown in Equation 1).  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷−𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷−𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷





V. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. COST EFFECTS OF SHORT-NOTICE PORT VISITS 
Chapter IV, Section A, included an explanation of where the data was sourced, what 
was excluded, and the strategy used in the four cross-tabulation models created using the 
pivot table function in Excel, which analyzed a total of 5,500 port visits. The researchers 
understood that the fleet utilizes the standardized LOGREQ when pulling into port. Each 
ship type should, in theory, request the same services. The researchers knew that some 
visits have deviations due to ships’ needs and the period of the stay. The researchers 
assumed that the best way to normalize the data was to take the daily average costs, separate 
them by ship class, and split them into specific time ranges. The specific time ranges refer 
to the timeliness of LOGREQ submissions and are in increments of 5 days. As mentioned 
previously, outliers were removed. The MAC IDIQ captures only Husbanding Services; if 
other services are needed, those are contracted via a separate contract. Due to the 
information in the dataset, quality and customer satisfaction were not taken into 
consideration in this analysis.  
The authors utilized Model 1 to determine if LOGREQ submission timelines affect 
port visit costs at the fleet level. Table 5 is a cross-tabulation table that shows the average 
daily cost per ship class arranged with the number of days prior to the port visit from when 
the LOGREQ was submitted versus the average daily price by ship class, broken down by 
fleet. A heatmap was applied to each column by individual fleet, with green being lower 
cost and red being higher cost. The results showed no pattern related to cost based on the 
number of days the LOGREQ was submitted prior to port visit ranges for each class type, 
illustrating that there is no evidence of correlation between cost and submission timeline. 
The researchers then combined the three fleets to see if more data would change the results. 
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Table 5. LOGREQ submission vs. average daily cost by the 5th, 6th, 
and 7th Fleets (10/01/2015 – 04/30/2020)  
 
To give a better visual illustration of the cross-tabulation of Model 1 shown in Table 
5, a line graph was produced (see Figure 5). The line graph shows the same data in a 
different form, again showing that there is no consistent correlation between the daily cost 
and LOGREQ submission timeline when broken down by fleet.  
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Figure 5. LOGREQ submission timeline vs. average daily cost by 
ship class for 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets 
Table 6 is a cross-tabulation table that shows the aggregate data from Table 5. The 
researchers combined the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets to further test Research Question 1, 
resulting in a consistent lack of evidence supporting correlation between the LOGREQ 
submission timeline and the average daily cost. A heatmap was applied to each column, 
with green being the lower cost and red being the higher cost, which showed that there is 
no evidence of correlation. 
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Table 6. LOGREQ submission vs. average daily cost for the 5th, 
6th, and 7th Fleets combined (10/01/2015 – 04/30/2020)  
 
 
To give an alternative visual illustration of the cross-tabulation Model 1 in Table 6, 
a line graph was produced (shown in Figure 6). The line graph shows the same data, again 
illustrating that there is no evidence of correlation between the daily cost and LOGREQ 
submission timeline for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets combined.  
 
Figure 6. LOGREQ submission timeline vs. average daily cost by 
ship class for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets (combined)  
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Table 7 is a cross-tabulation table that illustrates the number of port visits that 
occurred in the categories in Table 5, broken down by fleet. This shows the number of port 
visit entries averaged per each cross-tabulation cell of data. It is interesting that most 
submissions are in the 5-to-10–day mark for both the 5th and 7th Fleets, but there was no 
evidence of correlation between the price and the LOGREQ submission timeline. A 
heatmap was applied to each column by fleet, with green being the higher number of visits 
and red being the lower, which shows that there are more data points in the 5-to-10–day 
mark in the 5th and 7th Fleets, but still no evidence of correlation. 
Table 7. Number of port visits by LOGREQ submission timeline for 
the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the same information from Table 7 in the form of a line graph. 
This shows a significant number of port visits with the LOGREQ submitted in the 5-to-10–
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day mark for the 5th and 7th Fleets, but again, there is no correlation between the price and 
the LOGREQ submission timeline.  
 
Figure 7. LOGREQ submission timeline vs. number of port visits by 
ship class for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets 
Table 8 is a cross-tabulation table that shows Table 7’s data combined. This 
illustrates the number of port visits that occurred in the same categories as Table 6 to see 
the amount of data that visually calculated the figures. As shown in Table 8, the majority 
of the submissions are in the 5-to-10–day range (consistent with the 5th and 7th Fleets). A 
heatmap was applied to each column, with green being the higher number of visits and red 
being the lower, which shows that there are more data points between the 5-to-10 mark. 
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Table 8. Number of port visits by LOGREQ submission timeline for 
the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets (combined) 
 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the same information from Table 8 in the form of a line graph. 
This again shows a significant number of port visits with the LOGREQ submitted between 
the 5-to-10-day mark, as was expected when combining the three fleets.  
 
Figure 8. LOGREQ submission timeline vs. number of port visits by 
ship class for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets (combined) 
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B. IMPACT OF CONTRACTOR COMPETITION ON COST 
To answer the second research question, the researchers sought to identify the effect 
of competition on cost. The researchers analyzed a total of 4,570 port visits, comprised of 
34 port locations across the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets. Based on the port visit cost data, there 
is evidence to suggest that the Navy should expect to have higher contract costs in locations 
where there is only one contractor competing for husbanding contracts. 
For non-competitive periods, the average daily costs index across all fleets was 154, 
ranging from 16 to 356, or 89% below to 131% above average. Therefore, port locations 
where there was only one contractor competing for husbanding contracts between October 
1, 2015, and April 30, 2020, experienced average daily costs that were 54% higher than 
the fleet average. Table 9 reflects the ports across the fleets and their respective port indexes 
for non-competitive periods. For non-competitive periods, the port with the lowest index 
was Tromso, located in the 6th Fleet, with a port index of 16. Al Duqm in the 5th Fleet had 
the highest port index at 356. The standard deviation among the non-competitive period 
indexes is 91.3. 






5th Abu Dhabi 144 
5th Al Duqm 356 
5th Aqaba (Port of Aqaba) 275 
5th Doha 135 
5th Fujairah 192 
5th Jebel Ali 98 
5th Khalifa Bin Salman Port 201 
5th Mina Salman 27 
5th Muscat (Port Sultan Qaboos) 152 
5th Salalah 183 






6th Augusta Bay 104 
6th Brest 54 
6th Djibouti 110 
6th Faslane 45 
6th Gaeta - 
6th Haakensvern 130 
6th Haifa 263 
6th Lisbon 204 
6th Lochstriven 82 
6th Piraeus 268 
6th Port Victoria 82 
6th Souda Bay - 
6th Tromso 16 
7th Changi Naval Base - 
7th Chinhae 87 
7th Manila 315 
7th Phuket 311 
7th Pusan (Busan) 206 
7th Sasebo 80 
7th Sattahip 213 
7th Sembawang - 
7th Subic Bay 82 
7th Yokosuka 99 
 Summary Statistics 
 Lowest Index 16 
 Highest Index 356 
 Average Index 154 
 Standard Deviation 91.3 
 
Indexes for ports with two or more husbanding providers bidding for contracts 
during a fiscal year were much lower than they were for non-competitive periods. The 
smallest indexes were seen in periods with two or more husbanding providers bidding for 
contracts. On average, ports during competitive periods had a cost index of 118, which is 
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66% lower than ports during periods with no competition. Table 10 reflects the ports across 
the fleets and their respective port indexes for competitive periods. For competitive 
periods, the port with the lowest index was Mina Salman, located in the 5th Fleet, with a 
port index of 19. Manila in the 7th Fleet had the highest port index at 314. The standard 
deviation among the non-competitive period indexes was 68.9. 
Table 10. Port indexes of average daily costs, competitive periods 
Fleet Port Competitive Period Index 
5th Abu Dhabi 67 
5th Al Duqm 206 
5th Aqaba (Port of Aqaba) - 
5th Doha 124 
5th Fujairah 182 
5th Jebel Ali 64 
5th Khalifa Bin Salman Port 115 
5th Mina Salman 19 
5th Muscat (Port Sultan Qaboos) 107 
5th Salalah 87 
5th Sitra - 
6th Augusta Bay 118 
6th Brest 77 
6th Djibouti 99 
6th Faslane 40 
6th Gaeta 127 
6th Haakensvern 160 
6th Haifa 146 
6th Lisbon 239 
6th Lochstriven 86 
6th Piraeus 89 
6th Port Victoria 40 
6th Souda Bay 81 
6th Tromso 65 
7th Changi Naval Base 204 
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Fleet Port Competitive Period Index 
7th Chinhae 70 
7th Manila 314 
7th Phuket 239 
7th Pusan (Busan) 208 
7th Sasebo 82 
7th Sattahip 128 
7th Sembawang 49 
7th Subic Bay 58 
7th Yokosuka 94 
 Summary Statistics 
 Lowest Index 19 
 Highest Index 314 
 Average Index 118 
 Standard Deviation 68.9 
 
Among the three fleets, non-competitive periods in 7th Fleet were the highest, 
averaging 174 compared to 169 and 123 for the 5th and 6th Fleets, respectively. This means 
that ports in 7th Fleet that have only one husbanding provider bidding on a contract have 
historically experienced average daily costs to be 74% above the fleet average for 
husbanding services. The reason the 7th Fleet has the highest average indexes in both the 
competitive and non-competitive periods is unclear. The 7th Fleet has had fewer non-
competitive periods (15) than any other, which, based on research, should reduce cost. The 
7th Fleet AOR also has the second largest number of competitive periods (34). A large cost 
driver might be that key services, such as pilots, tugs, and utility services (e.g., potable 
water, sewage, and electric power), are less available than in the 5th and 6th Fleets, which 
increases costs.  
Table 11 reflects selected ports in the 7th Fleet AOR and their respective port 
indexes for competitive and non-competitive periods. The port with the lowest index was 
Sembawang during a competitive period, with a port index of 49. Manila during a non-
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competitive period had the highest port index at 315. The average port indexes for 7th Fleet 
were 145 for competitive periods and 174 for non-competitive periods.  
Table 11. Port indexes of average daily costs, 7th Fleet 




Changi Naval Base 204 - 
Chinhae 70 87 
Manila 314 315 
Phuket 239 311 
Pusan (Busan) 208 206 
Sasebo 82 80 
Sattahip 128 213 
Sembawang 49 - 
Subic Bay 58 82 
Yokosuka 94 99 
Summary Statistics 
Lowest Index 49 80 
Highest Index 314 315 
Average Index 145 174 
Standard Deviation 90.8 101.1 
 
Table 12 shows a breakdown of the number of competitive and non-competitive 
periods for each port. For 7th Fleet, there are more competitive periods (34) than non-
competitive periods (15). Most of the non-competitive periods occurred during FY 2016.  
Table 12. Period summary for 7th Fleet port competition 
7th Fleet FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 C N X 
Changi Naval Base C C C C C 5 0 0 
Chinhae N N C C C 3 2 0 
Manila N C C N X 2 2 1 
Phuket N C C C C 4 1 0 
Pusan (Busan) N N C C N 2 3 0 
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7th Fleet FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 C N X 
Sasebo N N N C C 2 3 0 
Sattahip N C C C C 4 1 0 
Sembawang C C C C C 5 0 0 
Subic Bay N C C C C 4 1 0 
Yokosuka N N C C C 3 2 0 
% Competitive ports 20% 60% 90% 90% 80% 34 15 1 
         
C = Competitive         
N = Non-
Competitive         
X = No Contracts         
 
The fleet with the smallest indexes was 6th Fleet utilizing competitive ports, with 
an average index of 105, compared to 108 and 145 for the 5th and 7th Fleets, respectively. 
Therefore, port locations where there are two or more husbanding providers competing for 
contracts experienced average daily costs that were 66% lower than port locations with 
only one competing contractor.  
Table 13 reflects selected ports in the 6th Fleet AOR and their respective port 
indexes for competitive and non-competitive periods. During a non-competitive period, 
Tromso recorded the lowest port index at 16. Piraeus had the highest port index at 268, 
which also occurred during a non-competitive period. The average port indexes for 6th 
Fleet were 105 for competitive periods and 123 for non-competitive periods.  
Table 13. Port indexes of average daily costs, 6th Fleet 
6th Fleet Ports Competitive Period Index 
Non-Competitive 
Period Index 
Augusta Bay 118 104 
Brest 77 54 
Djibouti 99 110 
Faslane 40 45 
Gaeta 127 - 
Haakensvern 160 130 
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6th Fleet Ports Competitive Period Index 
Non-Competitive 
Period Index 
Haifa 146 263 
Lisbon 239 204 
Lochstriven 86 82 
Piraeus 89 268 
Port Victoria 40 82 
Souda Bay 81 - 
Tromso 65 16 
Summary Statistics 
Lowest Index 40 16 
Highest Index 239 268 
Average Index 105 123 
Standard Deviation 54.3 85.7 
 
Table 14 shows a breakdown of the number of competitive and non-competitive 
periods for each port. For the 6th Fleet, there are more competitive periods (34) than non-
competitive periods (15). All periods in FY 2016 were non-competitive.  
Table 14. Period summary for 6th Fleet 
6th Fleet FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 C N X 
Augusta Bay N C C C C 4 1 0 
Brest N N C N N 1 4 0 
Djibouti N C C C C 4 1 0 
Faslane N C C C C 4 1 0 
Gaeta X C C C C 4 0 1 
Haakensvern N C C C C 4 1 0 
Haifa N N C C N 2 3 0 
Lisbon N C C C C 4 1 0 
Lochstriven X N C C N 2 2 1 
Piraeus N C C C C 4 1 0 
Port Victoria N C C C N 3 2 0 
Souda Bay X C C C C 4 0 1 
Tromso N C C C C 4 1 0 
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6th Fleet FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 C N X 
% Competitive 
ports 0% 77% 100% 92% 69% 44 18 3 
         
C = Competitive         
N = Non-
Competitive         
X = No 
Contracts         
 
Table 15 reflects selected ports in the 5th Fleet AOR and their respective port 
indexes for competitive and non-competitive periods. The port with the lowest index, 
which occurred during a competitive period, was Mina Salman, with a port index of 19. Al 
Duqm had the highest port index at 356, which occurred during a non-competitive period. 
The average port indexes for the 5th Fleet were 108 for competitive periods and 169 for 
non-competitive periods.  
Table 15. Port indexes of average daily costs, 5th Fleet 




Abu Dhabi 67 144 
Al Duqm 206 356 
Aqaba (Port of Aqaba) - 275 
Doha 124 135 
Fujairah 182 192 
Jebel Ali 64 98 
Khalifa Bin Salman Port 115 201 
Mina Salman 19 27 
Muscat (Port Sultan Qaboos) 107 152 
Salalah 87 183 
Sitra - 92 
Summary Statistics 
Lowest Index 19 27 
Highest Index 206 356 
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Average Index 108 169 
Standard Deviation 58.6 90.1 
 
Table 16 breaks down the number of competitive and non-competitive periods for 
each port. For the 5th Fleet, there are more non-competitive periods (31) than competitive 
periods (20). All periods in FY 2016 and FY 2017 were non-competitive. 
Table 16. Period summary for the 5th Fleet 
5th Fleet FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 C N X 
Abu Dhabi N N X N C 1 3 1 
Al Duqm N N C C C 3 2 0 
Aqaba (Port of Aqaba) N N N N N 0 5 0 
Doha X N C C X 2 1 2 
Fujairah N N N C C 2 3 0 
Jebel Ali N N C C C 3 2 0 
Khalifa Bin Salman Port N N C C C 3 2 0 
Mina Salman N N C C C 3 2 0 
Muscat (Port Sultan 
Qaboos) N N N C N 1 4 0 
Salalah N N N C C 2 3 0 
Sitra N N N N X 0 4 1 
% Competitive ports 0% 0% 45.4% 72.7% 63.6% 20 31 4 
         
C = Competitive         
N = Non-Competitive         
X = No Contracts         
 
One noticeable observation is that in the port summary for all of the fleets, there is 
a gradual increase in competitive periods from FY 2016 to FY 2020. The increase in 
competition can be contributed to the effectiveness of the MAC IDIQ acquisition strategy.  
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C. IMPACT OF SOLICITATION TIME ON AVERAGE DAILY COST 
Model 1 determined that the length of solicitation time does influence the average 
daily cost of a port visit. Table 17 shows the cross-tabular examination that illustrates that 
the number of days compared to the cost is seemingly random. While there is some 
correlation between average daily cost and the number of solicitation days, the researchers 
are confident that the solicitation period in days cannot be a determining factor in average 
daily cost. To determine the strength of the correlation, the researchers examined the R2 
value. An R2 value of 1 is a perfect correlation, while a value of 0 shows no correlation at 
all. The left-hand column of Table 17 details the number of solicitation days for port visits 
by ship class. The averages by solicitation day are in the right-hand column, and the 
averages by ship class are on the bottom row. A heatmap was applied to the average daily 
cost column by the number of days solicited and to the average daily cost row by the ship 
classes, green being lower cost and red being higher cost, which shows that there is no 
evidence of correlation. 
Table 17. Average daily cost by solicitation days and ship class  
  
 
Overall, the researchers compared 1,207 port visits to yield the totals in Table 18. 
Table 18 shows the number of port visits by ship class and the number of days the bid was 
in the solicitation period. The totals in the right-hand column are across all ship classes by 
50 
the length of the solicitation period, and the totals at the bottom represent the number of 
port visits each ship class made. 
Table 18. Number of port visits by ship class and solicitation days 
  
 
Graphically, the relationship between average daily cost and the solicitation days is 
shown in Figure 9. The graph shows a relatively straight trendline across the number of 
solicitation days, showing that the number of days in solicitation doesn’t appear to have an 
effect on cost. The graph in Figure 9 has an R2 value of 0.009. This is a very low R2 value 
and led the researchers to believe that the average cost is not affected by the solicitation 
days. Based on the slope of the trendline, it could be said that the average daily cost 
decreases by approximately $110 for each day of solicitation, but the R2 is so low that it is 
difficult to assume any correlation.  
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Figure 9. Average daily cost vs. solicitation days 
Figures 10 through 15 display the correlation by ship class. The error bars show the 
range of variability in the data and represent where there is uncertainty. Most have an R2 
value close to zero, meaning there is no evidence of correlation; however, the Submarines 
ship class has the strongest correlation at 0.3585. Figure 15 shows there are only five data 
points with over 10 days for submarines. It is hard to render a result based on sparse data.  
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Figure 10. Correlation of cost and the number of solicitation days for 
the ship class AMPHIBS 
Amphibious ships have a R2 value of 0.13. This value is closer to zero than one, 
thus there is no evidence of correlation. 
 
Figure 11. CRUDES 
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Cruisers and Destroyers have a R2 value of 0.0004 therefore there is no evidence of 
correlation. 
 
Figure 12. LARGE DECK 
Large Deck ships have a R2 value of 0.1869. This is higher than some of the other 
ship classes but is still far closer to zero than one, thus there is no evidence of correlation. 
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Figure 13. MSC 
MSC vessels have a R2 value of 0.0007 therefore there is no evidence of correlation. 
 
Figure 14. SMALL CRAFT 
Small Crafts have a R2 value of 0.0052 therefore there is no evidence of correlation. 
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Figure 15. SUBMARINES 
The submarines may have a stronger correlation due to internal operating 
procedures. Due to the nature of their operations, submarines send and receive fewer 
communications. The Submarine Group Command sends the LOGREQ on behalf of the 
operational unit. This streamlines the process and deviates less from the Standardized 
LOGREQ. By extension, the COR and KO then have less to review and approve. 
Submarines are restricted by which ports they enter. They tend to visit the same locations, 
where they can receive maintenance and replenishment. Given the classified nature of 
submarine missions, foreign ports cannot offer the same services. The lack of variation in 
locations and processes likely contributes to a better correlation in cost. 
Model 2 determined that the ratio of solicitation time had no impact on the average 
daily cost via the cross-tabular analysis in Table 20. Again, there are outliers with the Large 
Deck ship class, but most stay below $30,000. The Large Decks are always going to be of 
a magnitude higher than most other ships, as they support a larger crew and inherently need 
more services. The researchers were looking for trends, so as long as the Large Decks 
trended similarly, then the findings would be consistent.  
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Table 19. Percentage of solicitation time vs. average daily cost 
 




Graphically, the ratio is converted into the percentage of time the bid is solicited 
and is then compared to the average daily cost. The trendline appears to go down slightly, 
but the magnitude of the trend is not significant relative to the total cost. The number of 
port visits with a greater than 40% solicitation period is smaller than the other categories. 
ROW LABELS AMPHIB CRUDES LARGE DECK MSC SMALL CRAFT SUBMARINES GRAND TOTAL
<10% 7 29 8 106 18 15 183
10-20% 14 73 19 269 33 16 424
20-30% 18 68 7 205 27 7 332
30-40% 12 28 4 89 10 4 147
40-50% 2 15 1 43 4 3 68
>50% 4 47 2 53
GRAND TOTAL 53 217 39 759 94 45 1207
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Figure 16. Percentage of solicitation time vs. average daily cost 
trendline 
The solicitation time, whether by day or ratio, is not a good indicator of cost. 
Counterintuitively, the length of time—whether short or long—contractors were given in 
which to make offers did not appear to have a significant impact on cost. This could be 
because the husbanding service providers have standard pricing already available or good 
analytical tools in which to make rapid decisions. Some HSP contractors have their own 
organic assets and others need to outsource to subcontractors.  
It is worth further study to examine if a contractor has organic assets changes the 
effect on cost or solicitation time. The finding in Research Question 3 runs parallel to the 
early result from Research Question 1 about short-notice port visits. There is no evidence 
to support that timing, either short-notice or solicitation time, increases port visit cost. KOs 
should not be concerned with time as a deciding factor when considering price. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After a thorough quantitative analysis, the authors determined that the current 
oversight policies and contracting methods used to procure husbanding services do not have 
an adverse financial impact on the husbanding service process. Various tests and extensive 
quantitative analysis aided the researchers in arriving at this conclusion.  
Contrary to popular belief, there was no correlation between the LOGREQ submission 
timeline and the average daily cost of a husbanding contract. Actual data do not substantiate 
the idea that short-notice port visit requests increase contract costs. Over 5,000 husbanding 
contract data were analyzed individually at the fleet level and collectively by examining the 
5th, 6th, and 7th Fleets in a combined dataset. After thoroughly testing the data, both 
individually and collectively, the results did not change. The results suggest that the MAC 
IDIQ contracting strategy utilized for husbanding services is performing as intended. The 
increased competition has caused HSPs to standardize and refine their services to reduce costs 
and remain competitive. As contractors continue to standardize their services, short-notice 
port visits become less significant in determining the contractors’ bid prices. Because there 
are fewer unknowns in the services and products they can offer, contractors are less likely to 
artificially increase their bid price to account for unknown costs when faced with short-notice 
requests. The authors suspect contractors have become more efficient to remain viable options 
for husbanding services in an increasingly competitive landscape. 
The researchers discovered in their analysis greater insight and granularity regarding 
how the competition impacts Navy husbanding service contracts. The fact that more 
competition reduces contract costs is not particularly groundbreaking. Full and open 
competition is a general rule in government contracting, which safeguards agencies against 
collusion. The insights gathered from the research shows that even with competition, there 
could be ports experiencing higher prices, mainly due to limited resources. One way to 
identify ports with limited resources is to analyze those with an average competitive period 
index greater than the average index of all fleets. These ports are experiencing higher prices 
even though competition exists, which may point to a lack of resources in such ports. Further 
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research is needed to conduct a deeper analysis into the resources within these ports and 
provide recommendations on how Navy leadership can reduce costs. 
The findings in Chapter V demonstrate that the average daily price is not impacted by 
the amount of time the bid is solicited. This is counterintuitive, as it would be expected that 
the longer an offer is on the open market, the better price the government would get. Increased 
solicitation time should allow more contractors to bid, improving fidelity in price estimation 
and increasing preparation time to obtain resources from sub-contractors. This, however, is 
false. There is a misconception about the importance of time on cost. The data revealed that 
the amount of time a bid is solicited, whether in days or as a percentage of the pre-port visit 
arrival time, has little to no impact on the final average daily cost.  
There is more work to be done on this topic of study, and internal controls would 
facilitate future research. The HSPortal should be fully utilized to capture data needed for 
continuing analysis of husbanding services in the future. The researchers threw out many data 
points due to discrepancies in the data. Data collection could be improved by fully automating 
the HSPortal system so that time-stamps automatically populate as the workflow moves 
through the process. The ability to make recommendations was hindered by the lack of 
complete and accurate data. As the HSPortal dataset increases, the data’s quality should 
improve, allowing for a similar analysis to be conducted in the future. Those results may 
represent a more accurate prediction model for the solicitation period and average cost. 
It is worth investigating whether the contractor is sacrificing quality when less notice 
is given prior to the port visit. A process analysis based on the Quality Assurance Surveillance 
Plan (QASP) should be conducted to determine whether the quality of services received 
decreases when there are fewer notification days, as described in Research Question 1.  
Recent procurement scandals have shown that the government procurement process 
and acquisition professionals can easily fall victim to inefficiencies that can be costly in the 
absent of effective systems and procedures. Navy leadership must continue refining “internal 
controls over the management, execution, and oversight of husbanding service procedures” 
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